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Abstract: 
 
     Should the U.S. reassess its grand strategy and as part of this reassessment change 
its policy perspective strategically in Asia? These are difficult and contentious questions.  
However, given the current turbulence in global politics and political economy, their 
importance is undeniable. I argue that the US should change its grand strategy, giving 
up hegemonic practices and working multilaterally with other nations---particularly the 
BRICS in order to achieve the twin related goals of global peace and economic 
prosperity. U.S. policy towards Asia is much more than mere regional policy. As the 
largest continent on our planet, to a large extent Asia holds the key towards the global 
future for better or worse. U.S. relations with Asia are, therefore, crucial for any 
reasonable assessment of various pathways  to the global future. It is my hope that 
wise reciprocal (or even wise unilateral U.S.) policies will open the door towards a 
better planetary future. Part of this changed strategy will be to build the institutions for a 
hybrid global financial architecture where regional financial architectures play a crucial 
role for averting financial and economic crises. To this end cooperating with East Asia 
in particular is of great strategic significance. 
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U.S. Foreign Policy and Asia: 
Peace and Prosperity or Instability and Crisis? 
 
     Should the U.S. reassess its grand strategy and as part of this reassessment change 
its policy perspective strategically in Asia? These are difficult and contentious questions.  
However, given the current turbulence in global politics and political economy, their 
importance is undeniable. What I have to offer here are the beginnings of some serious 
analytical arguments － nothing more. But it is my hope that this will lead to further 
reflections and launch us on the way to achieve the twin related goals of global peace 
and economic prosperity. Thus, to use a musical metaphor, the underlying basso 
continuo in my argument is that U.S. policy towards Asia is much more than mere 
regional policy. As the largest continent on our planet, to a large extent Asia holds the 
key towards the global future for better or worse. U.S. relations with Asia are, therefore, 
crucial for any reasonable assessment of various pathways  to the global future. It is 
my hope that wise reciprocal (or even wise unilateral U.S.) policies will open the door 
towards a better planetary future. 
 
   The end of cold war led to what some have called the “unipolar moment”.  U.S. 
interventions in Asia and elsewhere since the end of cold war have led some prominent 
scholars in International Relations and Security Studies to question the US grand 
strategy. For example, referring to U.S. interventions in this period, Prof. Christopher 
Layne remarks thoughtfully: 
 
   Few raised their eyebrows about Panama (1989) of Haiti (1994, 2004). After all, the 
United States has a track record of wielding a big stick to maintain stability in its own 
backyard.  But the two wars with Iraq (1991, 2003), the U.S. military interventions in 
the Balkans (Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999), and the invasion of Afghanistan (2001) 
do stand out. The first war with Iraq was fought to exert U.S. geopolitical primacy in the 
Gulf.  The Balkan interventions aimed to “strengthen Washington’s control of NATO, 
the major institution for maintaining U.S. influence in European affairs” and to “project 
American power into the East Mediterranean region where it could link up with a 
growing U.S. military presence in the Middle East.” Afghanistan allowed the United 
States to do more than go after al Qaeda and the Taliban. The United States shored up 
its strategic position in the Middle East while simultaneously extending its reach into 
Central Asia and, in the process, challenging Russia’s influence in Moscow’s own 
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backyard. 
   Had the cold war not ended it is doubtful that the United States would have fought 
these wars. Why did the cold war’s end lead to a new wave of U.S. expansion? That’s 
easy. After the Soviet collapse, the United States stood head and shoulders above the 
rest of the world, militarily and economically. The United States, moreover, was imbued 
with an expansive conception of its world role and its interests. By removing the only 
real check on U.S. power, the Soviet Union’s demise presented the United States with 
the opportunity to use its capabilities to exert more control over － to “shape” － the 
international political system and simultaneously to increase its power. When the risks 
of doing so appear low ― and the potential rewards appear high ― states with lots of 
power usually succumb to the temptation to use it. In the years since the cold war the 
United States has extended its strategic reach because it had the motive, means, and 
opportunity to do so. 
 
(Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions, Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 2006: 2 )  
 
 
To the historically informed and sensitive observers, these events require deep reflection. 
Like Great Britain at the end of WWI, U.S. today is no longer a creditor nation. In fact, 
it is the biggest debtor nation in recorded history. Since the financial crisis and the great 
recession, the developed parts of the world economy have been in deep economic and 
social crisis. Although the BRICS and some other developing economies show healthy 
signs of growth, the worsening of wealth and income distribution in developing and 
developed countries alike, are deeply destabilizing trends. Indeed signs of looming 
crisis are everywhere. Under these circumstances, the order of the day should be 
seeking multilateral solutions to economic and political security problems. 
 
   But Asia does present special problems for the U.S. It is not only geographically 
vast, it s also enormously complex with a rich and complicated history. We can simplify 
by dividing Asia into four regions-- Middle East and Central Asia, East Asia, Southeast 
Asia and South Asia. Even in this simplified geopolitical and geo-economic scheme, I 
cannot hope to do justice to all the problems in all the sub regions. I will quickly 
mention the most salient problems in the three other regions before focusing a bit more 
on East Asia.But before turning to this let me point out some recent trends in rethinking 
US diplomatic history in the region. 
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Beginning at least with the distinguished historian, Charles S. Maier’s “Marking Time: 
The Historiography of International Relations, other scholars such as Sally Marks and 
Christopher Thorne attracted the attention of responsible historians to the parochialism, 
lack of linguistic and area training and thus the inability of the US IR and History 
scholars to “enter the texture of a foreign society”(Thorne 1988). Partly as a response to 
these challenges, a group of scholars such as Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Qiang Zhai, 
Shu Guang Zhang, Michael Sheng, Fredrik Logevall, Mark Bradley and Yukiko Koshiro 
have joined earlier distinguished group that includes the likes of Akira Iriye, Bruce 
Cummings and Robert J. McMahon. 
 
Our own  distinguished  colleague Prof. Suisheng Zhao has made many important 
contributions in the areas of Chinese Nationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy. Thus the 
practical policy makers today in the US, if they so desire,do have a lot of reliable 
scholarly sources to go to particularly with respect to East Asia. 
  
With this background for East Asian policy challenges in mind I will now turn to the 
sub-regions in Asia. 
 
   The main problems in Middle East are--- without exaggeration or dramatization － 
maintaining peace, distributing the gains from resource development to the people in the 
region and elsewhere in developing countries. Here, the major initiatives will have to 
come from the people in the region themselves. But the U.S. can play the role of a 
facilitator and honest broker while protecting its own legitimate national interest. 
   In South and Southeast Asia the problem is not so much to establish democracy as to 
deepen it. In the process, regional cooperation will need to be enhanced a great deal. 
Here, the ASEAN is a good example. But the SAARC falls short by a great deal. 
Perhaps from the U.S. perspective, engaging through APEC and bilaterally with South 
Asia on economic and cultural－educational－scientific cooperation holds the greatest 
constructive possibility and hope for the future. 
   I now turn to East Asia. This is the area that since the late 19
th
 century beginnings of 
the  U.S. open door policy has engaged the attention of U.S. policy matters the most. 
And rightly so. After the dramatic first half of the twentieth century, the key foreign 
policy strategy of containment was applied to East Asia in the post – Korean war 
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environment in an atmosphere of deep tension. Unfortunately, this tension still exists 
today. The engagement with PRC since 1971, has been a major success for U.S. policy. 
But for too many U.S. policy makers it is still set within the previous  coldwar- like 
framework. To many observers it seems that the fear from rising Japan in the late 1980s 
appears to have been transferred to China in the 21
st
 century. 
   Without ignoring the serious and potentially destabilizing threat from North Korea, 
it is clear that only a flexible diplomatic strategy that is based on mutual cooperation 
between U.S., China, Japan and the smaller powers in the region can ensure peace. The 
further long run strategic goal should be promote gradual confidence building measures, 
cooperation in specific economic and political disputes in providing energy, 
environmenatal, trade, and financial security. Ultimately, this should be tied to the grand 
strategy of collective security in the region. This will preserve, indeed deepen the 
economic benefits to the U.S. Equally important, over time, it will extricate the U.S. 
from politically and militarily costly entanglement in East Asia. 
   For all these reasons strategically focusing on and ongoing with East Asia should be 
the cornerstone of the shift in U.S. grand strategy over the next decade. 
 
    I now wish to focus on one specific area crucial for ensuring economic prosperity 
once peace prevails. This is technically called the problem of establishing a new global 
financial architecture. But I will deal with it as non – technically as possible.  
 It has been shown that IMF must and can change in a direction which allows for 
greater national policy autonomy (Khan 2013,2011,2008a,b, 2006, 2004). It has also 
been shown that the IMF needs complementary regional institutions of cooperation in 
order to create a stabilizing hybrid global  financial architecture that will be more 
democratic and pro-development in terms of its governance structure and behavior. 
Thus regional financial architectures will need to be integral parts of any new global 
financial architecture (GFA).The tentative steps taken towards regional cooperation in 
Asia since Asian financial crisis are discussed to illustrate the opportunities and 
challenges posed by the need to evolve towards a hybrid GFA. The opportunities and 
challenges arising from the current global crisis should be analyzed in this context. Such 
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an analysis pinpoints the need for the US to play a significant constructive role in both 
reformimg the IMF and supporting East Asian regional financial architecture. 
 
 
   Conclusion: 
 By 2007 most foreign policy  commentators had concluded that the unipolar moment 
had passed. As Samantha Power observed (quoted in Cohen, NYT, Nov. 12, 2007) the 
“core fact of recent years” had been the erosion of U.S. power. In today’s world the vast 
U.S. military power seem less important than economic capabilities. The global 
economic position of the U.S. is much weaker than ever before since WWII. Bush’s tax 
cuts, enormous war expenditures in Iraq and Afghanistan and increases in military 
budget generally have produced stratospheric deficits. After the first world war the U.S. 
had switched from being a big debtor to Europe, particularly U.K., to being the largest 
creditor with dollar edging out the pound sterling by 1929 (Eichengreen 2012). Today 
the U.S. is the world’s largest debtor country. Every year it is compelled to borrow more 
than 800 billion dollars from China, Japan, South Korea and other nations. In the recent 
crisis, U.S. economy is at best partially buoyed up by attracting funds from other 
nations that pour their surpluses into U.S. corporations and financial institutions.  
 
   This is a highly unstable situation financially and politically. A soft landing requires 
wise planning, partial withdrawal with off – shore hegemony or less by U.S. and 
strategic peaceful engagement with East Asia as a major partner. 
 
   Can this be done? Can the U.S. really manage it? While the challenge may seem 
overwhelming, the U.S. of all the nations in our planet has indeed an immensely rich 
foreign policy tradition from which to draw valuable lessons and apply them. These 
include:  
the imaginative defensive pragmatism of the peacemakers of 1780s and 1790s  as 
manifested by the basic realism of Washington, Hamilton and Adams; the shrewd 
mixture of idealism and practicality of Jefferson, Monroe, John Quincy Adams and 
Lincoln; the cultural and diplomatic flexibilities displayed by the likes of Townsend 
Harris and Dwight Morrow; the exemplary commitment to public service shown by 
Elihu Root, Eugene Meyer, Henry Stimson and Many others; the brave and noble if 
partly misguided fourteen points of Wilson; the amazing intuitive grasp of complex 
foreign policy issues by FDR ― to mention only a few. The tradition continues till 
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today. 
   However to use the famous expression of Abraham Lincoln, the North Americans 
must “disenthrall” themselves from chauvinistic and simplistic ideas about the U.S., its 
history and role in the world. No nation has ever been nor will ever be God’s chosen 
people. Prudence in engaging with the world and especially prudence in the use of still 
considerable U.S. power will be increasingly necessary to avoid disaster. As the New 
York Times columnist Roger Cohen wrote in 2007 (Oct.1): 
“The American idea can still resonate…[but]…our leaders must embody it rather than 
impose it.” This wisdom applies with particular force with respect to Asia, especially 
East Asia. 
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